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Abstract. In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework to con-
struct matching algorithms for any biometric authentication systems.
Conventional matching algorithms are not necessarily secure against
strong intentional impersonation attacks such as wolf attacks. The wolf
attack is an attempt to impersonate a genuine user by presenting a “wolf”
to a biometric authentication system without the knowledge of a genuine
user’s biometric sample. A “wolf” is a sample which can be accepted as
a match with multiple templates. The wolf attack probability (WAP) is
the maximum success probability of the wolf attack, which was proposed
by Une, Otsuka, Imai as a measure for evaluating security of biomet-
ric authentication systems [UOI1], [UOI2]. We present a principle for
construction of secure matching algorithms against the wolf attack for
any biometric authentication systems. The ideal matching algorithm de-
termines a threshold for each input value depending on the entropy of
the probability distribution of the (Hamming) distances. Then we show
that if the information about the probability distribution for each input
value is perfectly given, then our matching algorithm is secure against
the wolf attack. Our generalized matching algorithm gives a theoretical
framework to construct secure matching algorithms. How lower WAP is
achievable depends on how accurately the entropy is estimated. Then
there is a trade-off between the efficiency and the achievable WAP . Al-
most every conventional matching algorithm employs a fixed threshold
and hence it can be regarded as an efficient but insecure instance of our
theoretical framework. Daugman’s algorithm proposed in [Da2] can also
be regarded as a non-optimal instance of our framework.
1 Introduction
Biometric authentication systems automatically identify or verify individuals by
physiological or behavioral characteristics. They are used in various services such
as the immigration control at an airport, the banking transactions at an ATM,
the access control to restricted areas in a building, and so on. The increase in
the need of biometric authentication systems makes it important to explicitly
evaluate the security of them.
The false acceptance rate (FAR) (see the definition (3) in Section 2.2) is tra-
ditionally used as a security measure against the zero-effort impersonation at-
tack. The zero-effort approach assumes that an attacker will present his/her own
biometric data. But, it is clearly not a rational assumption, since an attacker
attempting to impersonate a genuine user will try to present a biometric data
of the genuine user or its imitation.
Ratha et al. approximately calculate the success probability of a brute-force
attack in a typical fingerprint-minutiae matching algorithm [RCB1]. The brute-
force approach assumes that an attacker blindly selects an input value. However,
if an attacker has some information about the algorithm employed in the sys-
tem, the attacker might be able to find a sample which shows high similarity to
most of the templates. Such a biometric sample is called a wolf (cf. [ISO1]). An
attacker could impersonate a genuine user with much higher probability than
FAR by presenting a wolf to a biometric authentication system.
With regard to the artefact attack, Matsumoto et al. showed that some bio-
metric authentication systems often falsely accepts some artefacts [MMYH1].
Therefore we should assume that an attacker may find a special input value not
only from biometric samples but also from non-biometric samples. Une, Otsuka,
Imai extended the definition of a wolf to include a non-biometric input value and
defined the wolf attack probability (WAP) (see Definition 3) [UOI1], [UOI2].
WAP can be regarded as the upper bound of the success probability of attacks
without the knowledge of a genuine user’s biometric sample. Une, Otsuka, Imai
proposed that WAP can be used as a security measure to evaluate the lower
bound of a security level in a biometric authentication system.
Our goal is to propose a theoretical framework to construct matching algorithms
for biometric authentication systems. Almost every conventional matching algo-
rithm employs a fixed threshold determined based on FAR and the false rejec-
tion rate (FRR) (see the definition (1) in Section 2.1). It is not necessarily secure
against the wolf attack. Une, Otsuka, Imai showed that in some of such match-
ing algorithms, there actually exist strong wolves and WAP can be extremely
higher [UOI1], [UOI2]. Surprisingly, as far as we know, no research have been
conducted on security of matching algorithms until now. This is the first paper
which studies the security characteristics of matching algorithms and gives a
theoretical framework how to construct them securely.
Suppose a matching algorithm employs a threshold determined by the entropy
of the probability distribution for each input value. We prove that if the entropy
for each input value is perfectly given, then the matching algorithm is secure
against the wolf attack (Theorem 1, 2).
In the real world, it might be difficult to perfectly calculate the entropy for each
input value, however, a more accurate computation of the entropy can achieve
a lower WAP . Then there is a trade-off between the efficiency of the matching
algorithm and the achievable WAP in the matching algorithm.
Previous results can be regarded as instances of our theoretical framework. Al-
most every previous matching algorithm employs a fixed threshold. In our the-
oretical framework, it can be regarded as an efficient instance which assumes
all input values have the same entropy. However, as mentioned above, it is not
exactly secure against the wolf attack.
Daugman proposed a matching algorithm in which a threshold is determined for
each match by taking account the number of bits available for comparison [Da2].
His method can also be regarded as an instance of our framework, which assumes
every bit of a sample independently and identically contributes to the entropy
of the probability distribution. WAP in his algorithm can be relatively lower
than that in an ordinary algorithm employing a fixed threshold. However, his
matching algorithm is not necessarily secure against the wolf attack (see details
in Section 4), since we have to assume that an attacker knows more accurate
information about the probability distributions.
This paper continues as follows. In Section 2, we will briefly introduce a typical
model of biometric authentication systems and give explicit definitions of FAR,
WAP , and security against the wolf attack. Our proposal can be easily adapted
to all matching algorithms of all modalities that employ symmetric prametric
functions such as the ordinary (Hamming) distance as the dissimilarity measure.
We will construct matching algorithms in the general case (Theorem 1) and in
the normal distribution case (Theorem 2) and show that these matching algo-
rithms are secure against the wolf attack. They give a theoretical framework to
construct secure matching algorithms for any biometric authentication systems.
In Section 4, we will reconsider previous results in our theoretical framework.
2 Model (Preliminaries)
A biometric authentication system can be used for verification or identification of
individuals. In verification, a user of the system claims to have a certain identity
and the biometric system performs a one to one comparison between the offered
biometric data and the template which is linked to the claimed identity. In
identification, a one to all comparison is performed between the offered data
and all available template stored in the database to reveal the identity of an
individual. In this paper, we will discuss verification systems.
Let U be a set of all possible users of the biometric authentication system.
Namely U is a set of all human individuals. For each user u ∈ U , the identity of
u can be denoted by u, namely the identities of users can be identified with U .
Let M be a finite set with a symmetric prametric function d : M×M → R,
namely d(x, y) = d(y, x), d(x, y) ≥ 0, d(x, x) = 0 for all x, y ∈M.
In an enrollment phase, for any user u ∈ U , an acquisition device measures
a biometric data of u. After processing the measurement data and extracting
relevant features, the features are represented as an element tu of M. Then the
template tu of u ∈ U is stored in the database of the system. In a verification
phase (matching phase) match, a user v ∈ U claims an identity w ∈ U and a
biometric measurement is acquired from v. This measurement is also transformed
into an element s of M. A matching process compares s with tw and match
generates a message, accept or reject, by a predetermined threshold τ ∈ R≥0 as
follows:
match(v, w) =
{
accept if d(s, tw) < τ
reject if d(s, tw) ≥ τ .
Each user u ∈ U enrolls and offers a certain biometric sample of u in an enroll-
ment phase and a verification phase, respectively. Therefore U can be regarded
as a set of the biometric samples of users. For each biometric sample u ∈ U ,
let Xu be a random variable on M representing noisy versions of u, namely
P (Xu = s) denotes the probability that biometric data of u will be transformed
into s ∈ M. Assume that the Xu, u ∈ U , are independent.
2.1 The false rejection rate
The false rejection rate (FRR) is the probability that a genuine user is rejected,
namely it is defined by
FRR = Ave
u∈U
P (match(u, u) = reject )
=
1
n
∑
u∈U
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)≥τ
P (Xu = s)P (Xu = t)
= 1− 1
n
∑
u∈U
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)<τ
P (Xu = s)P (Xu = t) (1)
where n = #U . For each user u ∈ U , let FRRu denote the probability that
the user u with the correct identity claim u will be rejected. Namely, FRRu is
defined by
FRRu =
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)≥τ
P (Xu = s)P (Xv = t)
= 1−
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)<τ
P (Xu = s)P (Xv = t) . (2)
It is easy to check that FRR =
1
n
∑
u∈U
FRRu.
2.2 The false acceptance rate
The false acceptance rate (FAR) is the probability that an offer of a user with a
wrong identity claim will be incorrectly accepted, namely FAR is defined by
FAR = Ave
(u,v)∈U×U
u6=v
P (match(u, v) = accept )
=
1
n(n− 1)
∑
(u,v)∈U×U
u6=v
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)<τ
P (Xu = s)P (Xv = t) . (3)
The measure FAR is traditionally used to express a recognition accuracy of
biometric systems. It is also used as a measure to evaluate the security of systems
against the zero-effort impersonation attack.
The zero-effort approach assumes that an attacker attempting to impersonate a
genuine user will present his/her own biometric data. This assumption is clearly
so far from reality, since an attacker will try to present a biometric data of a
genuine user or its imitation.
2.3 The wolf attack probability
Une, Otsuka, Imai proposed a new security measure for biometric authentication
systems [UOI1], [UOI2]. If an attacker can find an input value which matches
many templates, then he succeed in impersonating a genuine user with a higher
probability than FAR by presenting the input value to the biometric authenti-
cation system. Such an input value obtained from a biometric sample is called
a wolf by many authors (cf. [ISO1]). However, such an input value might be
obtained not only from biometric samples but also from non-biometric samples.
Matsumoto et al. show by experimentation that some artefacts can be falsely
accepted in some biometric authentication systems [MMYH1].
Considering these facts, we will extend the definition of a wolf as follows.
Let A be a set of all possible samples including non-biometric samples such as
artefacts or synthetic samples. For each w ∈ A, let FARw denote the probability
that the sample w with a wrong identity claim v 6= w will be incorrectly accepted
and let ARw denote the probability that the sample w with random claim will
be accepted. Namely, FARw and ARw are respectively defined by
FARw = Ave
v∈U\{w}
P (match(w, v) = accept)
=
1
# (U\{w})
∑
v∈U\{w}
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)<τ
P (Xw = s)P (Xv = t) , (4)
ARw = Ave
v∈U
P (match(w, v) = accept)
=
1
n
∑
v∈U
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)<τ
P (Xw = s)P (Xv = t) . (5)
It is easy to check that FAR =
1
n
∑
u∈U
FARu. The following theorem describes
the relation between FRRw, FARw and ARw.
Lemma 1.
ARw =


FARw if w ∈ A\U
1
n
(1− FRRw) +
(
1− 1
n
)
FARw if w ∈ U . (6)
Therefore it immediately follows that
1
n
∑
u∈U
ARu =
1
n
(1 − FRR) +
(
1− 1
n
)
FAR . (7)
Proof. For any w ∈ A\U , it is clear that ARw = FARw, since U\{w} = U . For
any w ∈ U , from the definitions (2), (4) and (5) of FRRw, FARw and ARw,
respectively, we have
ARw =
1
n
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)<τ
P (Xw = s)P (Xw = t)
+
n− 1
n
· 1
n− 1
∑
v∈U\{w}
∑
(s,t)∈M×M
d(s,t)<τ
P (Xw = s)P (Xv = t)
=
1
n
(1− FRRw) +
(
1− 1
n
)
FARw .
Therefore the results follow. ⊓⊔
Put
AR =
1
n
∑
u∈U
ARu =
1
n
(1− FRR) +
(
1− 1
n
)
FAR .
Note that usual biometric authentication systems obviously satisfy FAR ≤ 1 −
FRR, namely FAR ≤ AR.
Definition 1. (cf. [UOI1, Definition 3]) A wolf is defined as a sample w ∈ A
such that ARw > AR.
For any AR < p ≤ 1, a wolf w such that ARw = p is called a p-wolf. In
particular, 1-wolf is called a universal wolf.
Definition 2. [UOI1, Definition 4] Assume the following two conditions.
(i) The attacker has no information of a biometric sample of a genuine user to
be impersonated.
(ii) The attacker has complete information of the algorithms employed in the
enrollment phase and the verification phase.
The wolf attack is defined as an attempt to impersonate a genuine user by pre-
senting p-wolves with large p’s to minimize the complexity of the impersonation
attack.
Definition 3 (Wolf attack probability (WAP)). (cf. [UOI1, Definition 5])
The Wolf attack probability is defined by
WAP = max
w∈A
Ave
v∈U
P (match(w, v) = accept ) = max
w∈A
ARw . (8)
It is clear that AR ≤ WAP . Therefore, if FAR ≤ 1 − FRR, then we have
FAR ≤ AR = Ave
u∈U
ARu ≤WAP .
Definition 4 (Security against the wolf attack). For any δ > 0, a biometric
authentication system is δ-secure against the wolf attack if WAP < δ, namely
there exist no wolf w ∈ A such that ARw ≥ δ.
If we use only FAR as a security measure against impersonation attacks, then we
cannot explicitly evaluate the security against wolf attacks. Une, Otsuka, Imai
proposed to evaluate the security level against the wolf attack by computing
WAP [UOI1], [UOI2].
3 Matching algorithms secure against the wolf attack
For each s ∈ M and x ∈ R≥0, the probability Ps(x) that a template t ∈ M
obtained from a biometric sample of a user will be at a distance less than x from
s is defined by
Ps(x) =
1
n
∑
v∈U
∑
t∈M
d(s,t)<x
P (Xv = t) . (9)
Then we have
ARw =
∑
s∈M
P (Xw = s)Ps(τ) .
3.1 General case
Fix δ > 0. Then we will construct a matching algorithm δ-secure against the
wolf attack as follows.
Almost every conventional matching algorithm employs a fixed threshold τ pre-
determined based on FRR and FAR. However, we will employ a threshold τs
determined for each element s ∈ M obtained from the sample w ∈ A offered in
the verification phase. For each s ∈ M, put
τs = max{x ∈ R≥0 |Ps(x) < δ} .
Note that a set S = {x ∈ R≥0 |Ps(x) < δ} is a non-empty closed subset of R≥0
and therefore there exists the maximum of S.
For the implementation, we need to gather enough templates from each v ∈ U
and estimate the probabilities P (Xv = t) for all t ∈ M. Then we can determine
the threshold τs for each s ∈ M by doing the exhaustive search of all possible
x ≥ 0 such that Ps(x) < δ.
It is clear that
WAP = max
w∈A
∑
s∈M
P (Xw = s)Ps(τs) < δ .
The above discussion gives the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If the information about the probability distribution Ps(x) for each
s ∈ M is completely given, then, for any δ > 0, we can construct a matching
algorithm δ-secure against the wolf attack.
3.2 Normal distribution case
We assume that the distribution Ps(x) is normal with mean ms and standard
deviation σs for each s ∈M, namely
Ps(x) =
∫ x
−∞
1√
2piσs
exp
(
−1
2
(
x−ms
σs
)2)
dx (10)
for any x > 0. More strictly, we assume that Ps(x) can be approximately es-
timated by the above equation. The distributions of Hamming distances for
Daugman’s iriscode satisfy this assumption (cf. [Da1], [Da2]). Some authors use
the Gaussian assumption as the basis of their analysis (cf. [AYL1], [Ka1], [Wa1]).
In general, the real-valued features will tend to approximate a Gaussian distribu-
tion when they are obtained by a linear combinations of many components, e.g.
feature extraction techniques based on the principle component analysis (PCA)
or the linear discriminant analysis (LDA) (cf. [AYL1]). Under this assumption,
we can construct a secure and simple matching algorithm and show that the
matching algorithm is optimal, namely WAP is minimized to the (almost) same
value as AR.
Define the entropy H(P ) of the probability distribution P by
H(P ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
−P (x) log
2
P (x) dx .
By the assumption (10), it can be easily checked that
H(Ps) = log2
(√
2pie · σs
)
. (11)
We work with entropies H(P ) of continuous probability distributions P . Then
the entropy H(P ) is not always non-negative. It is clear from (11) that if σs <
1√
2pie
, then H(Ps) < 0. Note that if a fixed threshold is employed, then an input
value s ∈ M which has higher entropy H(Ps) and therefore larger deviation σs
can be accepted with higher probability.
Fix a real number α. For each s ∈M, put
τs = ασs +ms =
α2Hs√
2pie
+ms (12)
where Hs = H(Ps). By the assumption (10), we have
Ps(τs) =
∫ τs
−∞
1√
2piσs
exp
(
−1
2
(
x−ms
σs
)2)
dx =
∫ α
−∞
1√
2pi
exp
(
−z
2
2
)
dz
(13)
for all s ∈ M. Put
δ(α) =
∫ α
−∞
1√
2pi
exp
(
−z
2
2
)
dz .
The following theorem can be immediately proved.
Theorem 2. Assume that the standard deviation σs (or the entropy Hs) and
the mean ms are perfectly given for each s ∈ M. Then the matching algorithm
employing the thresholds τs, s ∈ M, defined by (12) is δ(α)-secure against wolf
attacks. Moreover, we have ARw = AR = WAP = δ(α) for all w ∈ A.
Proof. By the calculation (13), for all w ∈ A, we have
ARw =
∑
s∈M
P (Xw = s)Ps(τs) = δ(α) .
Therefore the results follow. ⊓⊔
Our generalized matching algorithm gives a theoretical framework for construct-
ing matching algorithms secure against the wolf attack for any biometric authen-
tication system. Under the ideal condition that for each s ∈M, the distribution
Ps(x) is completely calculated, our matching algorithm is optimal against the
wolf attack.
In the real world, it might be difficult to explicitly calculate the distribution
Ps(x) for all s ∈ M, however, a more accurate computation of σs, Hs, or ms
for each s ∈ M can achieve a lower WAP . Consequently, there is a trade-off
between the efficiency of the matching algorithm and the security evaluated by
the achievable WAP . In the next section, we will reconsider previous results as
instances of our theoretical framework.
4 Previous results in our framework
In this section, we will review previous results in the context of our theoretical
framework.
A conventional matching algorithm employing a fixed threshold can be viewed
as an efficient instance of our framework, which assumes every input value has
a constant entropy instead of computing the entropy for each input value. Such
a matching algorithm is not secure against the wolf attack.
Daugman proposes a matching algorithm which employs a variable threshold
in place of a fixed threshold as follows [Da2]. He employs a fractional Hamming
distance d = fHD defined by fHD(s, t) =
HD(s, t)
k
for any s, t ∈M = {0, 1}2048,
where k is the number of bits available for comparison. He determines a threshold
depending on k as follows:
τ(s, t) =
α′√
k
+
1
2
(14)
where
1
2
is the average of fHD(s, t) estimated from his database. His algorithm
can also be regarded as an instance of our framework, which assumes every
bit of each sample independently and identically contributes to the probability
distribution.
However, his algorithm is not necessarily secure against the wolf attack, since
every bit is not exactly independent and identical and the distributions Ps(x), s ∈
M, can be considerably different from each other. We assume that an attacker
has more accurate information about the distributions Ps(x), s ∈ M. If the
attacker can successfully find a smart input value s ∈ M such that the entropy
H(Ps(x)) is extremely high, then he can be incorrectly accepted with much
higher probability than AR.
Daugman’s matching algorithm is not always secure against the wolf attack,
however, it motivated us to research a theoretical framework to construct secure
matching algorithms.
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